Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance

Article Details
Title:	Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance
Article URLs:	https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611974331.ch98 http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2884533
Alternative Article URLs:
Authors:	Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi	Sapienza University of Rome
	Bart de Keijzer	Sapienza University of Rome
	Stefano Leonardi	Sapienza University of Rome
	Stefano Turchetta	University of Oxford
Sharing:	Unknown
Verification:	Authors have not verified information
Artifact Evaluation Badge:	none
Artifact URLs:
Artifact Correspondence Email Addresses:
NSF Award Numbers:
DBLP Key:	conf/soda/Colini-Baldeschi16
Author Comments:

ACM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2016